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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2013, in Prosecutor v. Perisic, 1 an Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) reopened an issue that some thought had been settled2 when it 
held that "specific direction" was an element of the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting in international criminal law. 3 The Appeals Chamber 
acquitted the highest-ranking Serbian official to have been prosecuted 
' Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law, B.A., Washington and 
Jefferson College; J.D., West Virginia University; LL.M (International Law), Cambridge 
University. I would like to thank the Barry University School of Law for its support in the 
writing of this article. 
I Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A Judgment (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
2 See, e.g:, Barbara Goy, Individual Criminal Responsibility Before the International 
Criminal Court: A Comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 12 Int'! Crim. L. Rev. I, 61 (2012). 
3 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment,~ 39. 
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by the Tribunal, which caused some to question the legitimacy and 
credibility of the ICTY. 4 Within a year, in Prosecutor v. Sainovic5 a 
different Appeals Chamber came to the opposite conclusion, 
"unequivocally reject[ing]" the Appeals Chamber's holding in Perisic6 
and convicting another Serbian general on facts nearly identical to those 
in Perisic. 
As the divergent results in these cases demonstrate, the stakes are 
high when it comes to the resolution of this doctrinal dispute. Aiding 
and abetting is an important weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal. One of 
the difficulties in such cases is striking the proper balance between 
convicting those who deserve criminal punishment, while at the same 
time not overextending criminal sanctions to those who play only 
marginal roles. 7 Judge Moloto, who dissented in the Trial Chamber in 
Perisic, argued that without appropriate safeguards, such liability could 
be virtually limitless: 
If we are to accept the Majority's conclusion based solely on the 
finding of dependence, as it is in casu, without requiring that such 
assistance be specifically directed to the assistance of crimes, then 
all military and political leaders, who on the basis of circumstantial 
evidence are found to provide logistical assistance to a foreign army 
dependent on such assistance, can meet the objective element of 
aiding and abetting. 8 
Because Perisic requires a "direct link between the aid provided by 
an accused individual and the relevant crimes committed by the 
principal perpetrators," i.e., "specific direction,"9 it will make 
convicting generals and political leaders who provided logistical aid to a 
distant conflict "practically impossible." 10 By contrast, Sainovic 
4 See, e.g., Two Puzzling Judgments in The Hague, Economist (June 1, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21578846/print. 
5 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
6 Id.~ 1650. 
7 See Gehard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. Int'! 
Crim. Justice 953, 957 (2007) (observing that, because international crimes involve large 
numbers of persons, "the need to determine the degree of individual culpability in international 
criminal law is even more imperative than in national legal systems"). 
8 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moloto, ~ 33 
(Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Perisic Trial Chamber 
Judgment]. 
9 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ~ 44 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
IO Marko Milanovic, The Limits of Aiding and Abetting Liability: The ICTY Appeals Chamber 
Acquits Momcilo Perisic, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-limits-of-
aiding-and-abetting-liability-the-icty-appeals-chamber-acquits-momcilo-perisic/. 
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requires only that the aid or assistance have a "substantial effect" on the 
commission of the crime; 11 that is, "the criminal act most probably 
would not have occurred in the same way had not someone acted in the 
role that the accused in fact assumed." 12 This is a demonstrably easier 
standard to meet. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute presents a third 
alternative - a mens rea test for limiting liability for aiding and abetting. 
Article 25 (c) (3) of the ICC Statute provides that the aider and abettor 
(accomplice) must purposely facilitate the commission of the crime 
committed by the principal. 13 This definition of aiding and abetting was 
borrowed from the U.S. Model Penal Code (MPC). 14 Since the ICC 
Statute departs dramatically from either approach taken by the ICTY, at 
first blush it is difficult to see how the ICTY's case law could be a 
source of interpretive guidance for the ICC. 15 Nonetheless, a recent 
Trial Chamber judgment of the ICC indicated, in dictum, that 
"substantial effect" is an element of aiding and abetting. 16 
It is clear that the ICTY' s reputation has been damaged by its · 
inability to set a limit on the proper scope of aiding and abetting 
liability. Because the ICC's mission is "to guarantee lasting respect for 
the enforcement of international justice," 17 it must find a standard for 
attributing individual criminal responsibility that avoids this pitfall. 
This article will analyze the three different approaches to aiding 
and abetting found in Perisic, Sainovic and the ICC Statute. It will 
consider whether the ICC can look to the ICTY's jurisprudence for 
interpretive guidance, as its nascent case law suggests it might, or 
whether the language of its Statute compels it to adopt a standard 
heretofore unknown in international criminal law. Part II of this article 
11 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, ii 1626. 
12 Prosecutor v. Tadii:, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment ii 688 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia May 17, 1997). 
13 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25(c)(3) (July 17, 1998), 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
14 Kai Ambos, Article 25, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Otto Triffterer, Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 760 (2d ed. 2008). 
15 Art. 21 of the Rome Statute allows the ICC to use "the principles and rules of international 
law" and "general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws and legal systems of 
the world" in interpreting its statute. Rome Statute, supra note 13, at arts. 21 (b) & (c). 
16 In its first Trial Chamber Judgment, the ICC implicitly recognized the customary law status 
of "substantial effect" as an "objective" element of aiding and abetting. Prosecutor. v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ii 997 (Mar. 14, 2012) (quoting, inter a/ia, Tadic Trial 
Chamber Judgment). This statement by the Lubanga Trial Chamber is obviously obiter dictum 
because it was not faced with the issue of interpreting the Rome Statute's definition of aiding and 
abetting. See id. 
17 Rome Statute, supra note 13, at Preamble. 
522 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 23:519 
will follow the evolution of the term "specific direction" from its roots 
in the ICTY's first appellate decision to its emergence as an 
independent element of aiding and abetting. Part III will dissect the 
Perisic and Sainovic decisions. Part IV will consider whether "specific 
direction" is an element of the customary international law definition of 
aiding and abetting. Part V will point out some of the difficulties the 
ICC will have to overcome in order to include a "substantial effect" 
element in its definition of aiding and abetting. Part VI will analyze the 
mens rea approach to aiding and abetting, and Part VII will offer my 
conclusions. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF "SPECIFIC DIRECTION" 
"Specific direction" finds its roots in the ICTY's first Appeals 
Chamber decision in Prosecutor v. Tadic. 18 Aiding and abetting was 
not an issue before the Tadic Appeals Chamber. Rather, the Appeals 
Chamber's focus was on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE). However, the 
Chamber distinguished the actus reus of aiding and abetting from that 
of JCE when it observed: 
The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, 
encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain 
specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton 
destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a 
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. 19 
18 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
19 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, iJ 229 (Int'] Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (emphasis added). This statement by the Appeals Chamber 
was unaccompanied by any analysis or citation of authority. By contrast, the Tadic Trial 
Chamber Judgment after discussing a number of the post-WWII cases, stated: 
The I.L.C. Draft Code [of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind] draws 
on these cases from the Niimberg war crimes trials and other customary law, and 
concludes that an accused may be found culpable if it is proved that he "intentionally 
commits such a crime" or, inter alia, if he "knowingly aids, abets or otherwise 
assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a crime .... " The 
commentary to the l.L.C. Draft Code provides that the "accomplice must knowingly 
provide assistance to the perpetrator of the crime. 
The Trial Chamber further observed that: 
While there is no definition of "substantially", it is clear from the 
aforementioned cases that the substantial contribution requirement calls 
for a contribution that in fact has an effect on the commission of the 
crime. This is supported by the foregoing Niimberg cases where, in 
virtually every situation, the criminal act most probably would not have 
occurred in the same way had not someone acted in the role that the 
accused in fact assumed. 
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Tellingly, the Tadic Appeals Chamber did not refer to the earlier 
Trial Chamber judgment in Furundiija. 20 The Furundiija Trial 
Chamber, after a thorough analysis of the post-World War II cases, held 
that "the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law 
requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which 
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."21 
Some subsequent Trial and Appellate Chambers cited the language 
from Tadic, 22 others cited Furundiija. 23 Several cases treated the 
definitions as interchangeable, citing both cases as authority for one 
definition or the other.24 Consequently, whether specific direction was 
or was not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting was of 
little significance until a defendant challenged his conviction because 
the prosecutor failed to prove that his acts were directed specifically to 
assist the crimes with which he had been charged. 25 The Blagojevic and 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ii 688 (Int'I Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia May 17, 1997). 
20 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. I 0, 1998). 
21 Id. ii 235. 
22 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ii 772 (Int'l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia January 14, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, 
Judgment, ii 254 (Int'[ Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001). 
23 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ii 283 (Int'! Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kovcka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, 
Judgment, ii 253 (Int'[ Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. 
Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ii 88 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Mar. 15, 2002); Prosecutor v. Vasilijevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ii 70 (Int'! Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 
Judgment, ii 46 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). 
24 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ii 252 (lnt'I Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) (not mentioning specific direction but quoting 
"substantial effect" language in Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case 
No. IT-96-23-T & !T-96-23/1-T, Judgment, iJ's 391-392 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (citing both cases but referring specifically only to "substantial 
effect"); Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2, Judgment, ii 400 n. 556 (Int'! Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) (noting that Furundzija, which extensively analyzed 
the actus reus elements of aiding and abetting was "essentially consistent with the Tadic Appeals 
Chamber's findings in this regard."); Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-
T, Judgment, ii 63 (Int'[ Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003) (citing Tadic 
Appeal Judgment for "substantial contribution" but not mentioning "specific direction"); 
Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ii 161 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ii 271 (Int'[ 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. I, 2004). 
25 See Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, iJ 182 (Int'! Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 27, 2007) [hereinafter Blagojevic and Jokic Appeals 
Chamber Judgment]: 
Jokic submits that the Trial Chamber erred in law by holding that his acts, as found, 
constituted the actus reus of aiding and abetting. While Jokic expressly does not 
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Jakie Appeals Chamber found that: 
[W]hile the Tadic definition has not been explicitly departed from, 
specific direction has not always been included as an element of the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting. This may be explained by the fact 
that such a finding will often be implicit in the finding that the 
accused has provided practical assistance to the principal perpetrator 
which had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime. The 
Appeals Chamber also considers that, to the extent specific direction 
forms an implicit part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, where 
the accused knowingly participated in the commission of an offence 
and his or her participation substantially affected the commission of 
that offence, the fact that his or her participation amounted to no 
more than his or her 'routine duties' will not exculpate the 
accused. 26 
Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber quoted the appeal chamber 
judgment in Aleksovski,27 which concluded, "the Tadic Appeal 
Judgement 'does not purport to be a complete statement of the liability 
of the person charged with aiding and abetting. "'28 Thus, while the 
Blagojevic and Jakie Appeals Chamber Judgment did not repudiate the 
specific direction language from Tadic, it did suggest that Tadic 's 
precedential value was limited because of its cursory approach to the 
issue, and that specific direction is satisfied by a finding that the 
accused's acts had a substantial effect on the principal's commission of 
the crime. 29 
challenge the Trial Chamber's definition of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, he 
argues that "[s]ome aspects of this definition need to be established in greater detail 
in order to enable them to be applied to the particular facts found by the Trial 
Chamber in this case." Jokic posits as a legal element of the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting that the practical assistance given to the perpetrators, in addition to having a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime, must be specifically or sufficiently 
directed to this end. 
The Trial Chamber defined the actus reus of aiding and abetting without mentioning "specific 
direction" as: "the accused carried out an act which consisted of practical assistance, 
encouragement or moral support to the principal." Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, Case No. 
IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ~ 726 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005). 
Interestingly, in support of its definition of aiding and abetting, the Trial Chamber cited the Tadic 
and Vasiljevic Appeal Judgments, both of which included the specific direction language. See id. 
~ 726 n. 2175. 
26 Blagojevic and Jokic Appeals Chamber Judgment,~ 189. 
27 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-1411-A, Judgment (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000). 
28 Blagojevic and Jokic Appeals Chamber Judgment, ~ 186 (quoting Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment,~ 163). 
29 See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Prosecutor's Reply Brief,~ 24 (lnt'I Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 11, 2012) (arguing that "specific direction is already 
implicit in the requirement that the accused's conduct have a substantial effect on the crime.") 
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Two years later, the Appeals Chamber in Mrksic and 
Slijvancanin30 interpreted the Appeals Chamber Judgment in Blagojevic 
and Jokic as confirming that '"specific direction' is not an essential 
ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting. "31 Subsequent Trial 
Chambers either defined aiding and abetting without referencing 
"specific direction" or they explicitly endorsed MrkSit and 
Slijvancanin 's conclusion that "specific direction" was not an element. 32 
In a judgment handed down just three months before the decision in 
Peri.Sit, the Lukic and Lukit Appeals Chamber read MrkSit and 
Slijvancanin as an unequivocal rejection of specific direction: "In 
Mrksit and Sljivancanin, the Appeals Chamber clarified "that 'specific 
direction' is not an essential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting and finds that there is no 'cogent reason' to depart from this 
jurisprudence. '"33 
Nonetheless, for some of the appeals chamber judges, this issue 
had not been put to rest. Judge Giiney, in his "Separate and Partially 
Dissenting Opinion" in Lukic and Lukic, argued that the greater weight 
of authority favored the specific direction criterion, and that the "MrkSic 
case remains the only case that departs from the jurisprudence without 
providing any cogent reasons for doing so, and, in any case, it should be 
considered as an obiter dictum which is not binding under the stare 
decisis doctrine .... "34 In a separate opinion from the same case, Judge 
Aigus opined: 
[W]hile the MrkSic and Sljivancanin Appeal Judgement 
categorically stated that 'specific direction is not an essential 
ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting', it did not 
'clarify' the situation at all. Rather, in my view, it appeared to 
represent a departure from the existing Appeals Chamber 
30 Prosecutor v. Mrksic and Sljivancanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Judgment (Int'! Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009). 
31 Id. ii 159. 
32 See Lukic and Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ii 901 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009) (omitting specific direction); Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., Case 
No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ii 1014 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June IO, 2010) 
(reading Blagojevic and Jakie as confirming "that 'specific direction' is not an essential 
ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting."); Prosecutor v. Dordevic, Case No. IT-05-
87/1-T, Judgment, ii 1873 (Int'( Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 23, 2011) (omitting 
specific direction); Prosecutor v. Perisic, IT-04-81-T, Judgment, ii 126 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011) (endorsing MrkSic and Sljivancanin). 
33 Lukic & Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Judgment, ii 424 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 20, 2009) (quoting Prosecutor v. Mrksic and Sljivancanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-
A, Judgment, iJ 159 and Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, ii 107). 
34 Lukic & Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Mehmet Giiney, ii I (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009). 
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jurisprudence regarding specific direction. 35 
Judge Aigus read the Blagojevil: and Joki/: Appeal Judgment as 
affirming "that the Tadil: definition of aiding and abetting, which 
includes the notion of specific direction as an essential element, had 
never been explicitly departed from." 36 Thus, the stage was set for the 
issue to be raised again in Perisic. 
III. SPECIFIC DIRECTION OR No SPECIFIC DIRECTION? 
A. Perisil: 
MomCilo Perisic was the Chief of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) 
General Staff from August 1993 until November 1995. 37 As such, he 
was the VJ' s highest ranking officer. 38 He was charged with various 
crimes39 that occurred in Sarajevo and Srebrenica based on his role "in 
facilitating the provision of military and logistical assistance from the 
VJ to the Army of the Republika Srpska ("VRS")."40 The prosecution 
alleged that he was responsible for these crimes under two different 
theories - aiding and abetting and superior responsibility. 41 
By a two to one vote, the Trial Chamber convicted Perisic of 
twelve counts in the indictment. 42 As to the counts where the 
defendant's individual responsibility was predicated on aiding and 
abetting, the Trial Chamber expressly applied a standard that did not 
include specific direction. 43 Judge Moloto vigorously dissented, 
arguing that to convict Perisic would "criminalize the waging of war" 
which is not a crime. 44 He also asserted that no superior had ever been 
prosecuted by the Tribunal merely for providing soldiers with weapons 
that they used to commit war crimes, and that "if a superior who 
35 Id., Separate Opinion of Judge Aigus, if 2. 
36 Id. if 4. 
37 See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, if 2 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
38 See id. 
39 The crimes included "murder, extermination, inhumane acts, attacks on civilians, and 
persecution as crimes against humanity and/or violations of the laws or customs of war." Id. at if 
3. 
40 See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, if 3 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
41 See id.; U.N. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
arts. 7(1) and 7(3), U.N. Doc. S/res/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
42 See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Judgment, irir 1837-1839. 
43 See id. at if 126 ("The Appeals Chamber expressly stated that 'specific direction' is not a 
requisite element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.") 
44 Id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moloto on Counts 1- 4 and 9 - 12, if 3. 
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supplies his soldiers is not charged, Perisic, who supplied a different 
army, should not be charged."45 
The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred as a 
matter of law by "holding that specific direction is not an element of the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting."46 And, while this error was 
"understandable given the particular phrasing of the Mrksic and 
Slijvancanin Appeal Judgement, . . . . [T]he Appeals Chamber will 
proceed to assess the evidence relating to Perisic' s convictions for 
aiding and abetting de novo under the correct legal standard."47 The 
correct standard, according to the Court, requires "explicit consideration 
of specific direction" when a defendant charged as an aider and abettor 
is remote from the crime.48 The result of the Perisic': Appeals 
Chamber's de novo review and assessment of the evidence was its 
conclusion that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Perisic' s acts were specifically directed at aiding and abetting 
crimes committed by the VRS. 49 
The Perisic Appeals Chamber premised its conclusion that specific 
direction is an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting on 
several factors. First, the Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment clearly 
defined the actus reus of aiding and abetting as including the specific 
direction element, and no other Appeals Chamber had "found cogent 
reasons to depart from [that] definition."50 Next, those post-Tadic cases 
that did not mention specific direction do not offer "a comprehensive 
definition of the elements of aiding and abetting liability." 51 Instead, 
those cases involved situations where the accomplice was physically 
proximate to the principal perpetrator of the crime and, thus, where 
specific direction is "self-evident."52 Finally, the MrkSic & 
Sljivancanain Appeals Chamber Judgment did not really depart from 
established precedent "by stating that specific direction is not an 
element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting" because: 1) its 
statement to that effect was made "in passing"; 53 2) its conclusion was 
in a section of the judgment which discussed "mens rea and not actus 
45 Id. 
46 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, '11 41 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
47 Id. at '1143. 
48 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, '11 39 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
49 Id. at '1173. 
50 Id. at '1128. 
51 Id. at '1130. 
52 Id. at f 38. 
53 Id. at '1132. 
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reus;"54 3) its cited authority was the Blagojevic and Jakie Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, which did not reject the Tadic standard, but rather 
simply stated the obvious when it observed that specific direction is 
often implicit in a finding of substantial effect; 55 and 4) its "passing 
reference" to specific direction did not amount to the "most careful 
consideration" required when departing from established precedent. 56 
B. Sainovic 
Less than a year later, the Appeals Chamber revisited the specific 
direction issue in Prosecutor v. Sainovic, et al. 57 This case focused on 
the armed conflict in Kosovo in 1999. 58 Vladimir Lazare vie, a 
General59 in the Serbian army, was Commander of the Pristina Corps 
until December 1999 when he was promoted to Chief of Staff of the 3rd 
Army. 60 The Trial Chamber did not hold Lazarevic individually 
responsible for the crimes charged in the indictment as a member of a 
JCE because the prosecution had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Lazarevic shared the intent of the members of the JCE. 61 The Court 
also did not find that "planning, instigating or ordering most accurately 
describe[d] the conduct of Lazarevic" and it therefore did not find him 
guilty pursuant to those modes of individual responsibility. 62 The 
prosecution's remaining theory was that Lazarevic had aided and 
abetted the deportations and forcible displacements that occurred in 
Kosovo from March to June 1999. 63 In that regard, the Trial Chamber 
concluded: 
[Lazarevic's] acts and omissions provided a substantial contribution 
to the commission of the crimes that the Chamber has found to have 
been committed by VJ [Yugoslav Army] members, as specified 
below, as they provided assistance in terms of soldiers on the ground 
54 Id. at 'll 33. 
55 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, 'l! 33 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
56 Id. at 'lJ 34. 
57 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al .. Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment (Int'I Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
58 See Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, Vol. I, 'l! I (Int') 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009). 
59 Ironically, it was Perisic who suggested that Lazarevic be promoted to General. See id. at 'll 
797. 
60 See id. at Vol. 3, if 791. 
61 See id. at Vol. 3, if 919. 
62 Id. at 'll 920. 
63 See Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, Vol. I, 'll 922 (Int') 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009). 
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to carry out the acts, the organisation and equipping of VJ units, and 
the provision of weaponry, including tanks, to assist these acts. 
Furthermore, Lazarevic's acts and om1ss10ns provided 
encouragement and moral support by granting authorisation within 
the VJ chain of command for the VJ to continue to operate in 
Kosovo, despite the occurrence of these crimes by VJ members. As 
the Commander of the Pristina Corps, Lazarevic knew that his 
conduct would assist the implementation of the campaign to forcibly 
displace Kosovo Albanians. 04 
529 
The Trial Chamber, whose definition of aiding and abetting did not 
include specific direction, 65 found Lazarevic guilty without explicit 
consideration of specific direction, as required by the Appeals 
Chamber's decision in Perisic. 
On appeal, Lazarevic challenged the Trial Chamber's failure to 
make an explicit finding that "his alleged acts and omissions were 
specifically directed to assist the commission of deportation and forcible 
transfer. ... " 66 Although the Trial Chamber had based its decision in 
part on Lazarevic' s presence in Kosovo during the time that the crimes 
were committed, it "did not find that he was physically present at the 
crime sites during the commission of the crimes by members of the 
VJ."67 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber could not circumvent the 
specific direction issue by ruling that this was a case of physical 
proximity where the finding of specific direction is implicit in the 
finding of substantial contribution. 68 
Initially, the Sainovic Appeals Chamber disagreed with the Perisic 
Appeals Chamber's characterization of Mrk.Sic and Sljivancanain 's 
consideration of the specific direction issue as being merely "in 
passing,'' and with its assertion that Lukic and Lukic merely confirmed 
that Mrk.Sic and Sljivancanain was not really "antithetical [to Tadic] in 
its approach to specific direction."69 For the Sainovic Appeals 
Chamber, Perisic was "at odds with a plain reading" of the two other 
cases. 70 Thus, Mrk.Sic and Sljivancanain and Lukic and Lukic "diverge" 
64 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, Vol. 3, ii 926. (Int'! Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009). 
65 See Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, Vol.l ii 89 (Int'! 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009). 
66 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, ii 1617 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
67 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, ii 1622 n. 5220. (Int'! Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) 
68 See id. 
69 Id. at ii 1620. 
70 Id. ati! 1621. 
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from Peri.Sic "on the issue of specific direction."71 Therefore, it was 
incumbent on the Sainovic Appeals Chamber to decide which approach 
to follow. 72 
The Appeals Chamber began by opining that Peri.Sic 's reliance 
on Tadic was based "on the flawed premise that the Tadic Appeal 
Judgement established a precedent with respect to specific direction," 
given that Tadic did not purport to be a "comprehensive statement of 
aiding and abetting liability."73 Next, it disputed Peri.Sic 's conclusion 
that, other than Mrk.Sic and Sljivancanain, no Tribunal cases had 
explicitly rejected specific direction as an element of the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting. 74 Instead it was the Peri.Sic decision, which was the 
outlier because, "prior to the Peri.Sic Appeal Judgement, no independent 
specific direction requirement was applied by the Appeals Chamber to 
the facts of any case before it."75 By contrast, determining the 
"substantial contribution of the accused has consistently been an 
element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability." 76 
The Sainovic Appeals Chamber also contended that the Peri.Sic 
holding was not reflective of customary international law. 77 Instead, the 
Furundiija Trial Chamber's formulation of aiding and abetting, which 
does not include specific direction and which was based on a careful 
and thorough analysis of customary international law, correctly defines 
aiding and abetting. 78 Nevertheless, in order to "dispel any doubt in this 
regard," the Sainovic Appeals Chamber undertook its own review of the 
cases, starting with the post-World War II cases,79 and concluded that 
"[t]he criteria employed in these cases were ... whether the defendants 
substantially and knowingly contributed to relevant crimes."80 
The Appeals Chamber then looked to national law, 81 which it 
found contained "no clear common principle" regarding the actus reus 
of aiding and abetting. 82 It was, however, able "to discern that requiring 
'specific direction' for aiding and abetting liability is not a general, 
71 Id. at'l! 1621, 
72 See id. at '111622. 
73 Id. at '111623. 
74 See id. at '11'111624-25. 
75 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, '111625 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
76 Id. 
77 See id. at '11'111626-42. 
78 See id. at '111626. 
79 Id. at '11'111627-42. 
80 Id. at '111642. 
81 Id. at '11'111643-46. 
82 Id. at '111644. 
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uniform practice in national jurisdictions."83 
Finally, the Appeals Chamber considered two other international 
instruments - The International Law Commission's Draft Code of 
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind84 and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). 85 The former 
provides that one who "knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists 
directly and substantially" in the commission of a crime is criminally 
responsible as an aider and abettor. 86 The ILC's Commentary explains 
that this means that an accomplice's participation must "facilitate the 
commission of a crime in some significant way." 87 According to the 
Sainovic Appeals Chamber, this statement conforms to the post-WWII 
cases and the Furundiija Trial Chamber's correct interpretation of those 
cases. 88 
The ICC Statute requires that the aider and abettor act with "the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of ... a crime .... " 89 How the 
ICC will interpret this provision, which may differ from customary 
international law, "remains to be seen," but adoption of the treaty "does 
not necessarily prove that the states consider the content of that treaty to 
express customary international law."90 In other words, the ICC Statute 
is not evidence of a new customary international law definition of 
aiding and abetting. 91 
In conclusion, the Sainovic Appeals Chamber endorsed the 
Furundiija Trial Chamber's definition of aiding and abetting as a 
correct statement of customary international law and "unequivocally" 
rejected the Perisic Appeals Chamber's approach. 92 
83 Id. at ii 1646. 
84 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, ii 1647 (Jnt'I Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014).; Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind with commentaries 1996, art. 2 (d), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7 _ 4_1996.pdf [hereinafter ILC 
Draft Code]. 
85 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, ii 1648 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014); Rome Statute, supra note 13. 
86 ILC Draft Code, supra note 84, at art. 2(d). 
87 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, 11 1647; ICL Draft Code, supra 
note 84, at art. 2 ( d) cmt. 11, at 21. 
88 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, 111647. 
89 Id. at 1648; Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art. 25(3)( c ). 
90 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, 111649. 
91 The ICC definition was not intended to reflect customary international law. The "for the 
purpose of facilitating" language in the ICC Statute was borrowed from the U.S. Model Penal 
Code and was not meant to be reflective of the jurisprudence of the ICTY and !CTR. Kai Ambos, 
Article 25, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court 760 (2d ed. 2008). 
92 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, 111650. 
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C. The Vote Count 
Of the five judges in Perisic, 93 only Judge Vaz, apparently 
endorsed, without qualification, the proposition that specific direction is 
an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting. 94 Judges Meron and 
Aigus wrote separately to express their opinions that specific direction 
is more appropriately viewed as an element of the mens rea of aiding 
and abetting, but they nonetheless joined in the final judgment, because 
specific direction can be "reasonably assessed in the context of the actus 
reus."95 Judge Daqun dissented because he did not think that specific 
direction is an element of aiding and abetting. 96 Although Judge 
Ramaroson agreed with Judge Daqun, she joined the judgment. 97 There 
was considerably more unity in Sainovic, where four of the judges, 
including Judges Daqun and Ramaroson, joined the Majority's opinion 
on the specific direction issue without qualification. 98 Judge 
Tuzmukhamedov would have distinguished Perisic, rather than 
departing from it, because Lasarevic's assistance was not remote, and 
therefore the failure to make an explicit finding regarding specific 
direction was not a fatal error. 99 
IV. Is SPECIFIC DIRECTION CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LA w? 
The Perisic Appeals Chamber did not purport to determine 
whether specific direction is customary international law. The fact that 
it discussed only one of the post-World War II cases makes this 
apparent. 100 Instead, its task was "to review [the ICTY's] prior aiding 
93 Both Appeals Chambers consisted of five judge panels. Judges Daqun and Ramaroson sat 
on both panels. 
94 I use the term "apparently" because Judge Vaz is the only judge in Perisii: who did not 
write separately on the issue. She is no longer a member of the Tribunal. About the Judges, U.N. 
ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10572. 
95 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Separate Opinion of Judges Meron and Aigus, 
if 4 (Int') Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
96 See id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Daqun, at if 2. 
97 See id. Separate Opinion of Judge Ramaroson, at if I. 
98 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, if 1649 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
99 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Tuzmukhamedov, iii! 43-45 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
100 The Perisic Appeals Chamber cited the Zyklon B case to support its conclusion that "the 
provision of general assistance which could be used for both lawful and unlawful activities will 
not be sufficient, alone, to prove that this aid was specifically directed to crimes of principal 
perpetrators." See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, if 44 n. 115 (Int'] Crim. 
Trib. forthe Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
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and abetting jurisprudence." 101 Thus, from the outset the Appeals 
Chamber's approach was flawed because, even if specific direction 
were found in the Tribunal's jurisprudence, it should be incorporated 
into the definition of aiding and abetting only if it also is a rule of 
customary international law. This fundamental principle was 
established in the Tadic, where the Court held that reference to 
customary international law was necessary in order to determine actus 
reus and mens rea elements, which were not defined by the Tribunal's 
Statute. 102 The Sainovic Appeals Chamber's thorough and exacting 
analysis of the pre-Tribunal cases stands in stark contrast, and its 
conclusion that specific direction was not a feature of customary 
international law is presumably correct on that ground alone. 103 
Moreover, the Perisic Appeals Chamber fails to make the case that 
specific direction is a feature of the Tribunal's jurisprudence. It 
proceeds from the premise that the Tadic Appeals Chamber articulated a 
precedential rule that should be departed from only when there are 
"cogent reasons" to do so based upon "the most careful 
consideration." 104 This seems wrong for at least two reasons: 1) the 
Tadic Appeals Chamber's definition of aiding and abetting was 
unnecessary to its decision and was therefore obiter dictum, 105 and 2) 
the Tadic Appeals Chamber's definition of aiding and abetting was 
unsupported by citation to any authority. 106 Furthermore, the Tadic 
Appeals Chamber Judgment did not refer to the Furundiija Trial 
Chamber's earlier decision, which thoroughly considered the pre-
Tribunal case law and defined aiding and abetting without a specific 
direction element. 107 If that were not enough, Tadic 's reference to 
specific direction was either ignored by subsequent Trial and Appeals 
Chambers, or its definitions of aiding and abetting were regarded as 
IOI Id. at 'I! 25. 
!02 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, '11194 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); see also Goy, supra note 2, at 3 ("The jurisprudence of the 
ICTY/ICTR on modes of liability can be considered an expression of international law because 
these tribunals apply customary international law and refer to general principles of law."). 
!03 The Sainovic Appeals Chamber's analysis of the post-World War II cases covers ten pages 
of the judgment. See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, '1!'111627-42. 
104 See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, '1!'1126-27, 34 (Int'I Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
!05 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, 'I! 1624 (observing that "the 
Tadic Appeal Judgement, which focused on JCE liability, does not purport to be a comprehensive 
statement of aiding and abetting liability"). 
106 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, '11229. 
107 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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interchangeable. 108 Thus, an objective analysis of the Tribunal's post-
Tadic jurisprudence reveals that the specific direction element was not 
treated as controlling precedent, and that the first case that ruled 
squarely on the issue was Mrksic and Sljivancanain, which rejected 
specific direction as an element of aiding and abetting. 109 
It is also telling that the Perisic Appeals Chamber misread the only 
post-World War II, pre-Tribunal case referred to in its opinion. In the 
Zykfon B case, 110 a British military court considered whether the owner 
and certain employees of the firm that manufactured the gas used by the 
Nazis in the concentration camps had aided and abetted the killings that 
took place in the gas chambers. The defense argued that the defendants 
"did not know the use to which the gas was to be put." 111 The Perisic 
Appeals Chamber cited Zyklon B to support its conclusion that specific 
direction requires more than "general assistance, which could be used 
for both lawful and unlawful activities." 112 According to the Appeals 
Chamber, the prosecution was able to overcome this hurdle in Zykon B 
because, in addition to providing the poison gas, that legitimately could 
have been used to exterminate vermin, there was evidence "that 
defendants arranged for S.S. [Schutzstaffel, a Nazi paramilitary 
organization] units to be trained in using this gas to kill humans in 
confined spaces." 113 While such evidence existed with regard to Tesch, 
the owner of the firm, 114 there was no direct evidence that Weinbacher, 
the other defendant who ran the firm in Tesch's absence, knew the 
purpose to which the gas was put. 115 Instead, the inference that 
108 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
110 The Zyklon B. Case, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, in LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS: SELECTED AND PREPARED BY THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION 93 (1947-1949), available at 
http://www.worldcourts.com/ildc/eng/decisions/ 1946. 03 .08_ United_Kingdom_ v _ Tesch.pdf 
[hereinafter The Zyklon B, Case]. 
111 Id. The third defendant, a lower level employee, also argued that he was not guilty because 
he had no control over the supply of the gas. He was acquitted on that ground. 
112 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, 'II 44 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
113 Id. at'1!44 n. 115. 
114 The Zyklon B, Case, supra note I IO, at 95; see also Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-
05-87-A, Judgment, 'II 1628 n. 5346. Specifically referring to the Perisic Appeals Chamber's 
reliance on Zyklon B, the Sainovic Appeals Chamber stated: 
However, although there was evidence concerning the provision of such training for 
S.S. units, this pertained only to one of the two convicted defendants. This and the 
Judge Advocate's instructions ... clearly indicate that the evidence concerning the 
provision of such training was not dispositive of the case. 
Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, 'I! 1628 n. 5346. 
115 The Zyklon B, Case, supra note 110, at I 02. 
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Weinbacher knew to what use the gas was put was based on "the 
general atmosphere and conditions of the firm itself." 116 Weinbacher 
was convicted and sentenced to death because he was in a position to 
control the deliveries of gas and he knew that the gas was used to 
execute Jews in the concentration camps. As to him, there was no 
evidence of specific direction and it was not the "basis for [his] 
conviction." 117 Thus, Zyklon B supported neither the Perisic Appeals 
Chamber's position that specific direction was an element of aiding and 
abetting, nor its contention that aiding and abetting could not be 
established if there existed another-lawful-purpose to which the aid 
could be put. 118 
The work of commentators is also important in determining 
whether a rule is customary international law. 119 Because the late 
Judge/Professor Antonio Cassese was a member of the Trial Chamber 
that decided Furundiija and the Appeals Chamber that decided Tadic, it 
is notable that he did not include specific direction as an element of 
aiding and abetting in his influential treatise on international criminaL 
law. 120 Professor Cassese did say that the subjective element (mens rea) 
requires that the "aider and abettor must willingly aim to help or 
encourage another person in the commission of a crime; in this respect, 
intent is therefore required." 121 In other words, the accomplice must 
116 Id. 
117 Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. JT-05-87-A, Judgment,~ 1628 ("The analysis [in Zyklon 
B] therefore focused on whether each defendant had influence over the supply of gas and knew of· 
the unlawful use of the gas despite the stated lawful purposes, such as disinfecting buildings. 
Whether the defendants specifically directed the supply of gas to the extennination was not a 
basis for the conviction.") 
118 See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment,~ 44 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
119 The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that "the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations [is a] subsidiary means of for the detennination 
of rules of law." U.N. Charter, art. 38(1)(d). The U.S. Supreme Court has also described the role 
scholars play in the detennining the customary status of a rule: "Such works [of jurists and 
commentators) are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors 
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." The 
Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
120 ANTONIO CASSESE, International Criminal Law 214 (2d ed. 2008) ("In aiding and abetting, 
the objective element is constituted by practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support, by 
the accessory to the principal [namely the author of the main crime]; in addition such assistance, 
support, etc. must have a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.") There is no 
authority cited for this definition. In the section of the treatise dealing with aiding and abetting, 
the Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment is cited twice: first, for the proposition that the principal 
need not know of the accomplice's contribution, and second for the proposition that the 
accomplice must know that his actions assist the perpetrator. Id. at 214-15 n. 2. 
121 Id. at 217. Again, the Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment is not cited. 
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intentionally, not recklessly or negligently, aid or influence the 
principal's commission of the crime. 122 
Obviously this statement regarding the mens rea of the aider and 
abettor does not provide support for the argument that specific direction 
is an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting. It merely states 
the familiar principle that the aider and abettor's conduct must be 
intentional. 123 Thus, aiding and abetting liability has two mens rea 
elements: intentional conduct and "awareness that the principal will be 
using, is using or has used the assistance for the purpose of engaging in 
criminal conduct." 124 
The specific direction element required by the Perisic Appeals 
Chamber has nothing to do with the accomplice's intent to commit the 
act. Specific direction, according to Perisic, "establish[ es] a direct link 
between the aid provided by an accused individual and the relevant 
crimes committed by principal perpetrators." 125 In this regard, 
Professor Cassese argued that Tadic 's requirement of a specific 
direction element should not be read "literally," as the Perisic Appeals 
Chamber apparently did, because it would stand the distinction between 
aiding and abetting and co-perpetration "on its head," as it would mean 
that the aider and abettor's contribution to the commission of the crime 
had to be greater than that of the co-perpetrator. 126 
122 See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 323, 346 (1985). 
123 See id. (The accomplice "must act with the intention of influencing or assisting the primary 
actor to engage in the conduct constituting the crime.") 
124 Cassese, supra note 120, at 215. 
125 Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ~ 44 (Int'] Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). "Substantial effect" also insures that there is a sufficiently 
close nexus between the accomplice's conduct and the resulting crime. See Kai Ambos, Article 
25, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court 756-57 (2d ed. 2008) ('"Substantial' means that the contribution 
has an effect on the commission; in other words, it must - in one way or another - have a causal 
relationship with the result."). 
126 Antonio Cassese, The Proper limits of Individual Responsibility, 5 J. Int'! Crim. Just. 109, 
115-16 (2007); Kai Ambos has made an almost identical argument: 
In fact, if one takes the objective distinction of the [Tadic] Appeals Chamber 
seriously, an aider and abettor would do more than a co-perpetrator [via JCE III]: the 
former carries out substantial acts "specifically directed" at assisting the perpetration 
of the (main) crime, while the latter must only perform acts (of any kind) that "in 
some way" are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose. This turns 
the traditional distinction between co-perpetration and aiding and abetting, i.e. the 
distinction with regard to the weight of the contribution, which must be more 
substantial in the case of co-perpetration, on its head. 
Kai Ambos, Amicus Curiae Brief in the Matter of the Co-Prosecutor's Appeal of the Closing 
Order Against Kaing Guek Eav "Duch", 20 Crim. L.F. 353, 365 (2009). 
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Kai Ambos, another prolific and influential commentator on 
international criminal law, described the Furudzija Trial Chamber's 
definition of aiding and abetting as the "more sophisticated view." 127 
Later in the same work, he rejected the specific direction element when 
he concluded that "the only limiting element [in the Furundzija 
definition of aiding and abetting] is the 'substantial effect' 
requirement." 128 And Professor Ambos apparently did not think that the 
Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment had the seminal force the Perisic 
Appeals Chamber attributed to it since he did not even cite Tadic. 129 
Finally, the ILC's Draft Code, a non-binding instrument, which 
provides evidence of the rules of customary international law, 130 does 
not include specific direction in its definition of aiding and abetting. 
The ILC Draft Code commentary indicates that its definition is 
"consistent with ... the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (art. 7, para. 1) and the statute of the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda (art. 6, para. 1)." 131 Moreover, it is 
also consistent with the Nuremberg Principles, Principle VII, which was 
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly as reflective of the rules of 
customary law found in the Nuremberg Judgment. 132 
127 Ambos, supra note 125, at 757. 
128 Id. at 759. 
129 The research for this article did not disclose a commentator who included specific direction 
as an element of the definition of aiding and abetting. See Goy, supra note 2, at 59 ("Under 
customary international law, aiding and abetting consists of practical assistance, encouragement 
or moral support to the principal provided there is a substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime." (citing the FurundZija Trial Chamber Judgment and the Blash: Appeals Chamber 
Judgment)); William A. Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2002-03); Gehard Werle, Individual 
Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 953, 955 (2007) ("The 
denomination of a mode of participation as a form of accessory liability suggests that a person's 
act had a substantial effect on the commission of a crime by someone else .... ");Jose Doria, The 
Relationship Between Complicity Modes of liability and Specific Intent Crimes in the Law and 
Practice of the ICTY, in The Legal Regime of the ICC: Essays in Honour of Prof. 1.P. 
Blishchenko 150 (Jose Doria et al., eds. 2009) (stating that the actus reus of aiding and abetting is 
"having substantially contributed to the commission of the offence by another person"); Richard 
Barrett and Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in 
International Tribunals, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 30, 40, n. 43 (2003); Gunel Guliyeva, The Concept of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise and ICC Jurisdiction, 5 Eyes on the ICC 49, 58 (2008) ("There are two 
objective elements of aiding and abetting. First, aiding/abetting requires acts rendered 'to assist, 
encourage or lend moral support' to the commission of a concrete offence. Second, such acts 
must have a 'substantial effect' on the commission of the crime .... ") 
130 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, iJ 1647. 
131 I LC Draft Code, supra note 84, at art. 2( d) cmt 11, 21. 
132 See id.; Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal (1950), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTR0/390. 
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In order for a rule to be deemed customary international law, there 
must be substantial agreement (in the form of state practice) regarding 
its status as a legal rule (opinio Juris et necessitatis). 133 The decisions of 
international tribunals like the ICTY can, of course, be evidence of the 
content of such rules. 134 But where, as here, there are conflicting 
decisions from a single tribunal regarding an element of a rule, 135 it is 
not reasonable to deem that aspect of the rule as customary international 
law, even if there is some support in the case law. 136 When there is no 
support for that element of the rule among the commentators or in the 
highly influential ILC Draft Code, it is clear that the customary legal 
definition of aiding and abetting does not include specific direction. 
V. Is SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT A FEATURE OF THE ICC STATUTE'S 
APPROACH TO AIDING AND ABETTING? 
Unlike specific direction, the requirement that an accomplice's act 
must have a substantial effect on the commission of the crime by the 
principal perpetrator is well-established in the case law of the ICTY. 137 
Moreover, after a thorough review of the pre-Tribunal case law, the 
Furundiija Trial Chamber concluded that "[t]he position under 
customary international law seems therefore to be best reflected in the 
proposition that the assistance must have a substantial effect on the 
commission of the crime." 138 In its first Trial Chamber Judgment, the 
ICC implicitly recognized the customary legal status of "substantial 
effect" as an "objective" element of aiding and abetting when it 
observed: 
[P]rincipal liability "objectively" requires a greater contribution than 
accessory liability. If accessories must have had "a substantial 
effect on the commission of the crime" to be held liable, then co-
perpetrators must have had ... more than a substantial effect. 139 
133 See IAN BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law 5-9 (4th ed. 1990). 
134 See id. at5. 
135 Even in PeriSil': itself there was no consensus among the judges regarding the status of 
specific direction. Two of the five judges did not agree that specific direction was an element of 
aiding and abetting, while two others thought it was more properly characterized as a mens rea 
element. See, supra pp. 16-17. 
136 See The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 28-29 (observing that 
where decisions of municipal tribunals were divided, it was not possible to conclude that a rule of 
customary international law exists). 
137 See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, i!l625 ("By contrast [with 
specific direction], the substantial contribution of the accused has consistently been an element of 
the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability.") 
138 Prosecutor v. FurundZija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ii 234. 
139 Prosecutor. v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ii 997 (quoting inter alia 
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Despite this statement, when faced squarely with the issue of 
interpreting its statute, the ICC will encounter serious obstacles to 
including such an element in Article 25 ( c )(3). 
The drafters of the ICC Statute were undoubtedly aware of the 
ILC's Draft Code, which provides that the acts of the aider and abettor 
must contribute "directly and substantially" to the commission of a 
crime, 140 and the early case law of the ICTY and ICTR to the same 
effect. 141 These factors led Professor Schabas to speculate that: "The 
absence of words like 'substantial' in the Rome Statute and the failure 
to follow the International Law Commission draft, may suggest that the 
Diplomatic Conference meant to reject the higher threshold of the 
recent case law of The Hague and Arusha." 142 In the end, the language 
in the ICC Statute that emerged from the Rome Conference was: 143 
3. [A] person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person: 
( c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, 
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
. . 144 comrruss10n .... 
In his authoritative commentary on Article 25, Professor Ambos 
writes that the "'for the purpose of facilitating' language was borrowed 
from the Model Penal Code" and that "the word 'facilitating' confirms 
that a direct and substantial assistance is not necessary .... " 145 
Yet, without some requirement that the aid or assistance actually 
contributes in a meaningful way to the commission of the crime, there is 
the possibility that liability could be imposed for actions "so minor or 
remote that it appears unjustified to attribute it to the accomplice." 146 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T). This statement by the Lubanga Trial Chamber is 
obviously obiter dictum because it was not faced with the issue of interpreting the Rome Statute's 
definition of aiding and abetting. Id. iii! 996-97. 
140 See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in The International Criminal 
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute 198 (Roy S. Lee, ed. 1999); !LC Draft Code, supra note 
84, at art. 2( d). 
141 See William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 81-82 (2001 ). 
142 Sc ha bas, supra note 14 1, at 82. 
143 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute 435 (2010) ("The purpose requirement was added during the Rome Conference, but 
nothing in the official records provides any clarification for the purposes of interpretation."). 
144 Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art. 25(c)(3). 
145 Ambos, supra note 125, at 760; see also Prosecutor v. FurundZija, Case No. IT-95-17 /1-T, 
Judgment, iJ 231 ("The wording [of the Rome Statue] is less restrictive than the ILC Draft Code, 
which limits aiding and abetting to assistance which 'facilitate[s] in some significant way', or 
'directly and substantially' assists, the perpetrator."). 
146 I The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 800 (Cassese et 
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This apparent lacuna in the Rome Statute might tempt the ICC to 
borrow from the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals in order to read a 
substantiality requirement into its statute. 147 Nonetheless, such a 
substantiality requirement would be inconsistent with the mens rea 
approach to aiding and abetting adopted by the ICC Statute. 
VI. THE MENS REA APPROACH TO AIDING AND ABETTING 
The language in Article 25 (3)(c) of the ICC Statute and Section 
2.06 (3)(a)(ii) of the MPC are functional equivalents. 148 The mens rea 
of both is with (or for) the purpose of facilitating the commission of a 
crime. 149 The MPC defines "purposely" as having a "conscious object 
to engage in conduct of that nature," 150 i.e., to promote or facilitate the 
commission of an offense. 151 
The ICC Statute does not define purpose in relation to conduct. 152 
Article 30, 153 however, defines "intent" as "the person means to engage 
in that conduct." 154 Since purpose is undefined in Article 25 (3) (c) the 
ICC Statute, the ICC may look to Article 30, 155 and in tum the MPC, 156 
al., eds. 2002). 
147 See Werle, supra note 7, at 969 ("The wording of Article 25(3)(c) does not require that the 
assistance has a substantial effect on the commission of the crime. However, within the ICC 
Statute's framework of modes of participation, it is reasonable to interpret the actus reus of 
assistance in this way."); Goy, supra note 2, at 62-63 (opining that a substantial effect 
requirement "seems to be consistent with the structure of Article 25(3) ICC Statute ... "); I The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 800 (Casesse, et al. eds. 2002) 
("[T]he formulation of aiding and abetting in the Rome Statute might be interpreted in the same 
way [to include 'directly and substantially']. Still hopes should not be raised too high."). 
148 Compare Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art. 25 (3)(c) ("a person shall be criminally 
responsible ... if that person: ( c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, 
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including 
providing the means for its commission") with MPC § 2.06 (3)(a)(ii) ("A person is an accomplice 
of another person in the commission of the offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or 
facilitating the commission of the offense, he ... (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other 
person in planning or committing it .... "). 
149 See id. 
150 MPC, supra note 148, at§ 2.02 (a)(i). 
151 Id. at§ 2.06 (3)(a). This means that the accomplice's conscious object must be to facilitate 
the principal's commission of a crime. For example, an accomplice who drives a robber to the 
location where the robbery is committed is guilty only if she does so knowing that the principal 
intends to commit the robbery. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 490, § 30.09 [2][a] 
(6th ed. 2012). 
152 See Markus D. Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity, 5 J. lnt'I Crim. Justice 977, 1000 (2007); 
see also William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute 435 (20 I 0). 
153 Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art. 30. 
154 Id. at art. 30(2)(a). 
155 In this regard, it is significant that "[t]he text [of Article 25] was also burdened with 
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for guidance when it is faced with defining the term. 157 If that 
eventuates, the similarity in the language used in the MPC and the ICC 
Statute makes the two approaches virtually indistinguishable; 158 i.e., the 
accomplice must act with the conscious object (mean) to facilitate the 
commission of a criminal offense. 159 More importantly, it is clear when 
it comes to aiding and abetting the ICC Statute has raised the mens rea 
bar because, unlike in the ICTY, "knowing assistance" will not be a 
sufficient basis for imputation of liability from principal to 
accomplice. 160 
The MPC also contains a specific provision regarding the mens rea 
of an accomplice where "causing a particular result is an element of an 
offense." 161 In such cases, the accomplice must act "with the kind of 
culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the 
commission of the offense." 162 For all intents and purposes, that means 
that the accomplice must act either purposely, knowingly or recklessly, 
as those terms are defined by the Code. 163 This does not, however, 
mean that the accomplice must "share" the principal's intent with regard 
to the result. Indeed, it is possible that the accomplice and the principal 
could be convicted of different crimes, if, for example, the principal 
committed an intentional homicide and the accomplice was reckless as 
references to the mental element (e.g., intent and knowledge) because agreement had not yet been 
reached as to the text [of Article 30]." Per Saland, supra note 140, at 198. 
156 Like Article 25 (3)(c), Article 30 also was influenced by the MPC. See Kai Ambos, 
Critical Issues in the Bemba Confirmation Decision, 22 Leiden J. Int'! Law 715, 717 (2009). 
157 See Dubber, supra note 152, at 1000; see also M PC § 1.13 ("General Definitions ... (I 2) 
'intentionally' or 'with intent' means purposely .... "). 
158 Purposely is used in the MPC to distinguish the two slightly different mental states that 
were included in the common law term "intent." MPC, supra note 148, at cmt. § 2.02 ("In 
defining the kinds of culpability, the Code draws a narrow distinction between acting purposely 
and knowingly, one of the elements of ambiguity in legal usage of the term 'intent."'). 
159 See I The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 801 ("[H]e must know as well 
as wish that his assistance shall facilitate the commission of the crime."). 
160 Dubber, supra note I 52, at 117 ("knowing assistance doesn't qualify for complicity'); 
Ambos, supra note 125, at 760 ("While the necessity of this requirement was controversial within 
the American Law Institute, it is clear that purpose generally implies a specific subjective 
requirement stricter than mere knowledge."); I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 810 ("In sum, while the objective requirements of aiding, abetting, and 
assisting are relatively low, the criminal responsibility of aiders and abettors contains certain 
restrictions by means of higher subjective requirements."). 
161 MPC, supra note 148, at~ 2.06(4). It should be noted that the most of the crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC fall into this category. Thus, in the majority of cases this element will 
have to be satisfied. 
162 Id. 
163 See MPC, supra note 148, at§§ 2.02 (2) (a)-(c). The MPC disfavors negligence as a basis 
for criminal liability and thus "it should be excluded as a basis unless explicitly prescribed." 
MPC, supra note I 48, at cmt. § 2.02 (5). 
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to that result. In that situation, the principal would be guilty of murder 
while the accomplice is guilty of manslaughter. 164 
The ICC Statute does not contain a specific provision regarding the 
accomplice's mens rea vis a vis the result. Accordingly, Article 30 of 
the ICC Statute applies, since it specifies the mental state required for 
the commission of an offense, "[u]nless otherwise provided." 165 Article 
30 defines "intent" with regard to the consequence element as: "the 
person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in 
the ordinary course of events." Thus, Article 30 would permit 
conviction even if the principal and accomplice had slightly different 
mentes reae, i.e., intent and knowledge; 166 however, proof of either is 
sufficient for conviction. 167 
Given the Perisii:-Sainovii: split over the specific direction element 
and the evident similarities between the MPC and Articles 25 (3)(c) and 
30 of the ICC Statute, the interpretive task facing the ICC will be 
challenging. In the next section, I will suggest what course the ICC 
should follow. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The ICC will have to confront the issue of imposing appropriate 
limits on the reach of accomplice liability. The ICTY case law and the 
ICC Statute adopt radically different solutions to the problem. The 
former imposes control objectively by requiring knowing assistance that 
substantially effects the commission of the crime. The latter takes the 
subjective approach - the accomplice must purposely facilitate the 
commission of the crime. A third alternative, Perisii:'s specific 
direction test, contains elements of both. Thus, the accomplice must 
specifically direct the aid or assistance toward commission of the crime 
to the exclusion of any other purpose, and the aid or assistance must 
also have a substantial effect on the commission of the crime. 
A simple hypothetical involving a reluctant accomplice and a 
forgetful principal will illustrate the differences in outcome, depending 
164 See Dubber, supra note I 52, at I I 8-19. 
165 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 30 (I). 
166 See Rome Statute, supra note I 3, at art. 30(2)(b). Defining knowledge as "awareness 
that ... a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events." 
167 An unresolved question is whether Article 30, and specifically the phrase "aware that a 
[consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events," includes do/us eventualis (advertent 
recklessness). ICC Pre-Trial Chambers have split on this question. See Goy, supra note 2, at 23. 
The ICC's only trial chamber judgment rejected the argument that the language in Article 30 
encompasses do/us eventualis. Prosecutor. v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment,~ 
I IOI. 
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upon which of the three approaches is used. In the first case, a would-
be bank robber begs his wife to get him a gun. She, the reluctant 
accomplice, gives it to him, hoping and praying that he decides not to 
rob the bank. Under the "substantial effect" test, she is guilty as an 
accomplice if her husband robs the bank using the gun. 168 The opposite 
is true if the "purposely facilitates" formula is applied because, in order 
for her to be guilty as an accomplice, she must want the bank robbery to 
occur, rather than hoping it does not. 169 
In the second case, the wife fervently wants the bank robbery to 
succeed because she needs the money to feed her hungry children. 
Unfortunately, her husband, the forgetful principal, leaves the gun 
behind and ends up robbing the bank by giving the teller a note 
demanding the money. If the "purposely facilitates" test is applied to 
these facts, the wife is guilty as an accomplice because it is irrelevant 
that her aid had no effect on the commission of the crime. 170 If, on the 
other hand, a "substantial effect" on the crime is necessary, she is not 
guilty because her aid played no role in the outcome, despite her desire 
that it be used to commit the crime. 171 
If the Peri.Sic "specific direction" test is applied, there is 
accomplice liability in neither case. The reluctant accomplice has not 
specifically directed her aid toward successful completion of the 
crime. 172 According to Peri.Sic, "the element of specific direction 
establishes a culpable link between the assistance provided by an 
accused individual and the crimes of principal perpetrators." 173 Because 
the reluctant accomplice hoped that there would be no crime, she lacks a 
culpable mental state with regard to it. 174 Likewise, the accomplice, no 
168 See supra note 12 and accompanying text ("[T]he criminal act most probably would not 
have occurred in the same way had not someone acted in the role that the accused in fact 
assumed.") 
169 See I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 801 ("[H]e must 
know as well as wish that his assistance shall facilitate the commission of the crime."). 
170 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
171 Kai Ambos, Article 25, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Otto Triffierer, Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 756-57 (2d ed. 2008) ("'Substantial' 
means that the contribution has an effect on the commission; in other words, it must - in one way 
or another - have a causal relationship with the result."). See also Kai Ambos, The First 
Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive 
Analysis of the Legal Issues, 12 lnt'I Crim. L. Rev. 137, 147 (2012) (observing that "causality is a 
basic unwritten requirement of any result crime"). 
172 See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, 'I! 37. 
173 Culpability is the mental state (mens rea), which the defendant must have with regard to 
each material element of the offense. Dressler, supra note 151, at 139, § 10.07 [A]. 
174 Under the ICC Statute, she must either mean to cause the crime or know that it "will occur 
in the ordinary course of events." Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art. 30 2(b) and 3. Since the 
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matter how enthusiastically she wishes that the crime will take place, 
will not be guilty if there is a forgetful principal who is not influenced 
by her proffered aid, since in those circumstances the aid did not have a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime. 175 
The question remains which of these models is best-suited to the 
ICC, and, given the limitations in its statute, which could (should) be 
adopted by it? The Perisic approach-requiring both specific direction 
and substantial effect-would too narrowly restrict attribution of liability, 
particularly in cases involving military or political leaders. This 
approach would insulate them from liability when it could not be proven 
that they wanted the aid to be used to commit a crime. Consequently, 
the result would be impunity in cases where the aid could be used for 
another (legitimate) purpose. 176 The result would also be impunity in 
those cases where the commander's aid, no matter how fervently he 
desired the result, had no substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime. 177 . 
The ICTY and ICC formulas, while less restrictive, deal with the 
issue of culpability quite differently. The ICTY approach puts greater 
emphasis on outcome, so that the accomplice who is aware of, but does 
not intend, the result is punished if the result comes to pass, so long as 
his contribution to it is substantial. This method of attributing liability 
has a greater deterrent effect because commanders risk criminal 
punishment if they provide the weapons, ammunition, or personnel used 
accomplice cannot know whether the principal will actually commit the offense, the requisite 
knowledge would be very difficult to prove. See Kadish, supra note 122, at 344 (observing that 
"the acts the principal does toward the commission of the crime represent his own choices"). 
175 In common law jurisdictions where any degree of influence or assistance suffices, it is 
possible that an unsuccessful attempt to aid the commission of the offense might provide enough 
encouragement to result in liability. As Professor Kadish explains: 
There is no accomplice liability where the attempted contribution demonstrably 
failed to achieve its purpose because it never reached its target. ... The secondary 
party may be liable ifthe principal is aware of the proffered aid, since 
knowledge of the efforts of another to give help may constitute sufficient 
encouragement to hold the secondary actor liable. But it is well 
accepted that the secondary actor may not be held liable where his 
demonstrably ineffective effort to aid is unknown to the primary actor. 
Kadish, supra note 122, at 359. It is highly unlikely that a soldier in the field who is the principal 
perpetrator of a war crime would be aware of the logistical support provided by senior officers 
like Perisic and Sainovic. 
176 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
177 For example, dissenting Judge Moloto disputed the Perisic Trial Chamber's finding that 
the assistance the defendant provided to the Bosnian Serb forces had a "substantial effect" on the 
crimes committed at Srebrenica because out of the 3,644 bullet casings that were recovered only 
378 could be traced to the Serbian manufacturing facility.See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-
04-81-T, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moloto, "ii 12. 
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to commit war crimes, even if that aid had other legitimate military 
uses. By contrast, the ICC Statute requires that the accomplice must act 
with the intention of facilitating the commission of a crime (the result). 
This approach should alleviate the concerns of those who fear that an 
overly aggressive prosecutor could use aiding and abetting to expand 
criminal liability beyond the bounds of personal culpability. But it 
would not reach indifferent commanders, like Perisic, who continue to 
supply troops committing crimes, even after the use to which the aid is 
put is known. 
Since purposeful facilitation is an explicit requirement of the ICC 
Statute, the Court must find that that element has been satisfied. It 
should not, however, impose the additional requirement that the 
accomplice's aid or assistance must have a substantial effect on the 
commission of the crime. To do so would not only make it incredibly 
difficult to convict, but it would also be unnecessary, because both 
purposeful facilitation and substantial effect place meaningful limits on 
extensions of criminal liability. 
Moreover, there are significant impediments to reading 
"substantial effect" into Article 25 (c)(3) of the ICC Statute. First, there 
is no textual support for a substantial effect element in the ICC Statute. 
And, despite its status as customary international law, reading such a 
requirement into the statute would be inconsistent with the MPC 
approach to aiding and abetting. Clearly, the MPC is not a source for 
"general principals of law derived . . . from national laws and legal 
systems of the world," and therefore cannot be applied directly by the 
ICC to interpret Article 25 (c)(3) of its statute. Nevertheless, the Court 
should not ignore Article 25 (c)(3)'s roots in the MPC, which do not 
require a "substantial effect." 
Purposeful facilitation may turn out not to be the best choice for 
international criminal law. It almost certainly will pose difficult 
problems of proof since establishing a subjective element, like purpose, 
is always more difficult than proving an objective element, like 
substantial effect. This will be especially true in cases involving 
military and political leaders whose participation in the crime is far 
removed from the battlefield. The substantial effect test may also be 
better suited to international criminal law because of its potentially 
greater deterrent effect. Nonetheless, the stricter limits that purposeful 
facilitation will place on accomplice liability may, in the long run, 
bolster the credibility of international criminal law by ensuring that only 
those who are truly culpable are punished. 
